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IN THE UTAH STATE COURT OF APPEALS 
VIRGINIA YEARSLEY, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
OFFICER DEAN JENSEN, ET AL, 
Defendants/Respondents 
Case No. 88029 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This was an action sounding in trot that was originally 
filed by the Plaintiff as an action against three (3) police 
officers from three (3) different jurisdictions for assault and 
other improper conduct that arose from an incident that happened 
at Plaintiff's home on the late evening hours of August 28, 1983 
and the early morning hours of August 29, 1983. 
DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW 
Following the filing of a Notice of Readiness For Trial, 
after discovery had been completed and just immediately prior to 
a Trial which had been set for some time, Defendants' filed a 
Motion to Dismiss on the basis of certain statute of limitations 
violations. 
The Plaintiff sought to amend the Complaint to allege a 
continuous tort of false imprisonment and other unlawful conduct. 
Following two (2) hearings, on September 14, 1987 and 
November 2, 1987, the Motion to Amend was denied and the 
Defendants7 were granted Summary Judgment. 
That Judgment was filed on November 16, 1987 and an appeal 
1 
was taken to the Supreme Court on December 16, 1987 which 
transferred the case to this Court on March 4, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES SOUGHT TO BE REVIEWED 
1. Whether the concept of continuous tort is applicable to 
the allegations of this case. 
2. Whether the Court erred in not granting Plaintiff's 
request to amend the Complaint prior to Trial. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
(The following fact statement is taken from the 
pleadings in the case, including Plaintiff's 
Affidavit and the Memoranda supplied at the 
time of the Summary Judgment Hearings. There 
has been no Evidentiary Hearing in the case 
and therefore, citations will not be to an 
Evidentiary Transcript, but the facts are 
based upon the allegations contained in those 
various pleadings.) 
In the late evening hours, approximately 10:30 p.m., of 
August 28, 1983, the Plaintiff, along with other friends were 
returning the Plaintiff's home located in Washington Terrace, 
Utah from a boating excursion at Pineview Reservoir east of 
Ogden, Utah. 
At that time, Plaintiff was a passenger in a motorhome which 
was driven by her boyfriend, Jerry Wells. The motorhome was 
owned by him and registered to him. 
That upon entering Washington Terrace City, a Washington 
Terrace police officer pulled behind the motorhome and pulled up 
to the motorhome as it parked in front of the Plaintiff's home. 
Plaintiff exited the motorhome and entered her home. 
Shortly thereafter, apparently the officers had probable cause to 
2 
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believe that Jerry Wells had been driving while intoxicated and 
proceeded to arrest him and also proceeded to attempt to arrest 
others who they believed were involved in public intoxication. 
Subsequent to the Plaintiff entering her home, the 
Washington Terrace officers called for assistance from officers 
from Riverdale City and South Ogden City, adjacent jurisdictions. 
At this time, no arrest was made of the Plaintiff. The officers 
i 
entered her home, without knocking and without any authorization 
and initially requested that she move the motorhome. 
After informing the officers that the motorhome did not 
belong to her, a verbal argument ensued. The Plaintiff was then 
accosted initially by Washington Terrace officers and then by 
Riverdale officers and South Ogden officers and was physically 
beaten and abused. Plaintiff was dragged from the interior of 
her home to the porch and then out onto the driveway area and 
subdued. 
At this time, Plaintiff was not arrested, but was 
transported by the officers to the McKay Dee Hospital, which was 
approximately ten (10) miles away. Plaintiff was not released 
from the McKay Dee Hospital until approximately 1:00 a.m. on 
August 29, 1983. Following her release, Plaintiff was then 
handcuffed, placed into a patrol car and taken to the Weber 
County Jail in Ogden where she was booked at approximately 1:30 
a.m. on August 29, 198 3. 
At that time, Plaintiff was formally arrested on a number of 
charges, including resisting arrest, inferring with an officer 
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and disturbing the peace. Plaintiff remained incarcerated in the 
Weber County Jail until she was able to arrange bail and was 
released shortly before noon on August 29, 1983. 
The officers then proceeded to file Complaints with the 
Washington Terrace City Attorney's Office and a prosecution then 
ensued on misdemeanor counts for the above referenced charges. 
At the time of Plaintiff's trial, some two (2) months later, 
all charges but one, the disorderly conduct, was dismissed and 
Plaintiff plead guilty to a plea bargain arrangement to that 
charge. 
At the time of the plea bargain, there was no agreement on 
the part of the Plaintiff that she would not take legal action 
against the City, the various police agencies and the officers 
involved, nor was there any factual determination by the Court 
that the charge of disturbing the peace justified any of the 
officers actions, either prior to or subsequent to the alleged 
conduct. i 
The Plaintiff initially filed her Notice of Claim against 
Riverdale, Washington Terrace and South Ogden Cities and the 
named officers in this case, Dean Jensen, Wallerstein and Steve 
Smith, on August 29, 1984. All Cities were served on the same 
day. 
Plaintiff contended that no City specifically responded, ( 
either affirmatively or negatively to the Notice of Claim and the 
lawsuit was initiated on November 27, 1985. 
Following the initiation of the lawsuit, all three (3) 
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entities and the three (3) named officers were represented by 
counsel. Interrogatories were submitted which were answered by 
the Plaintiff, numerous settlement discussions were entertained, 
but none came to fruition and a period of almost two (2) years 
passed when the matter was finally set for trial. 
That some three (3) weeks before the trial was set to begin, 
the Defendants, for the first time, filed Motions for Summary 
Judgment, claiming that the statute of limitations had been 
violated. 
The basis of the claim was that the focus of the lawsuit was 
on the actual assault of the Plaintiff by the Defendants, which 
occurred at the time the officers entered her home and drug her 
therefrom at approximately 10:30 p.m. or 11:00 p.m. on August 28, 
1983. 
Plaintiff took the position at the initial hearing, on 
September 14, 1987, that it considered the incident as one 
continuous incident, beginning in the late evening hours and 
continuing through her transportation to the jail, the booking 
and her incarceration in the jail until noon on the 29th. 
Plaintiff requested from the Court that the Complaint be 
amended to conform to the facts. The Court took this matter 
under advisement and allowed the Plaintiff to prepare an amended 
Complaint. 
At that time, the Court also ruled, without objection from 
the Plaintiff, that based upon the present status of the law of 
the State of Utah, that the Cities could not be individually held 
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as responsible parties in the lawsuit and that the only parties 
which could remain in the lawsuit, pending a ruling on the 
statute of limitations problem, was the three (3) officers. 
Accordingly, the Cities were dismissed. In the amended 
Complaint, Plaintiff alleged the tort of false imprisonment and 
false arrest as part of the continuing actions of the tortuous 
conduct of the Defendants. 
The matter was then continued to November 2, 19871 for 
further hearing. On November 2, 1987, the Judge denied the 
Plaintiff the opportunity to raise false imprisonment and false 
arrest, claiming that it changed the basic character of the 
lawsuit and further, found that the conduct, although beginning 
on the 28th and continuing to the 29th, was not of such a 
continuous tortuous nature that it could be brought into a suit 
for which the claim was filed on the 29th and therefore, 
determined that the claim was outside the statute of limitations 
and did not reach the other factual issues of the case. 1 
Summary Judgment was therefore granted and it is from that 
decision that the Plaintiff appeals. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The Court erred in refusing to allow Plaintiff to amend the 
Complaint prior to the trial to conform to the facts. 
POINT I < 
THE COURT ERRED IN DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
REQUEST TO AMEND HER COMPLAINT AT THE 
PRETRIAL HEARING WHICH WOULD HAVE 
DEFEATED DEFENDANTS7 STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS 
ARGUMENT 
6 
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It is a well settled rule in the Trial Courts of this State, 
that because Utah is a Notice rather than a code pleading State, 
that the Courts have broad discretion to allow either party to a 
lawsuit to amend its pleadings, either prior to the Trial or even 
during or at the end of Trial to conform the facts and evidence 
presented, as long as parties are not prejudiced therefrom. 
In this case, Plaintiff contends that the Court abused its 
discretion in not allowing an amendment to the Complaint prior to 
a trial. 
There is no question that Plaintiff's original Complaint in 
this action focused on the issue of assaultive behavior, a 
deliberate and intentional tortuous act by the Defendants. 
However, it is also clear, and Defendants were certainly on 
notice, that the acts complained of were in the course of their 
duties as police officers when they effected an arrest and later, 
after returning the Plaintiff who they had beaten severely enough 
to require hospitalization, booked into a jail and incarcerated 
her for a period of time and then later prosecuted her for 
alleged offenses. 
All of the Defendants knew that the lawsuit arose out of 
this conduct, although it was not specifically plead. 
Interrogatories were requested of the Plaintiff by some of the 
Defendants and were provided to counsel for all Defendants, where 
Plaintiff specifically addressed the issue of what happened to 
her on the late evening hours of the 28th and the early morning 
hours of the 29th of August, 1983. 
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There is no question that all parties to the suit knew 
before any of the Summary Judgment Motions were filed, that the 
entirety of the offense covered a two (2) day period and involved 
an assault, an arrest, an incarceration and a prosecution. 
Yet Defendants, through counsel, at the time of the hearing, 
expressed dismay that counsel was now attempting to amend to 
specifically address the false imprisonment and false prosecution 
issues. 
It is Plaintiff's contention that in effect, under Utah law 
and the common practice in the Courts, that the Complaint could 
have been amended at the time of trial to encompass these issues, 
but the amendment was made before trial, no one was prejudiced, 
all the evidence was preserved, it did nothing to change the 
case, except that it completely destroys any argument that the 
Defendants had with respect to the statute of limitations of the 
initial Notice of Claim, without even contemplating the issue of 
continuous tort, if in fact the Complaint was amended, to allow 
for false imprisonment, false arrest and improper prosecution, 
these actions clearly took place on the 29th, not on the 28th and 
Plaintiff's Notice was therefore, within the statute of 
limitations. 
In effect, in this case, the Court had to determine whether 
to completely cut the Plaintiff off from any remedy because of 
the one year statute of limitations violation or to allow in its 
discretion, the amendment and preserve the case so that the 
merits could be addressed. 
8 
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Plaintiff contends that the Court should examine legislative 
and historical reasons for the statute of limitations. 
Essentially, the statute of limitations was enacted to encourage 
judicial economy and to encourage the bringing of lawsuits with 
expedition and in a timely fashion so that all parties to the 
lawsuit will have fresh evidence and be able to sustain their 
position without the lapse of time. 
The statute in question here is 63-30-13, which allows a one 
(1) year period to sue a municipality or an employee thereof for 
actions arising out of their work. Therefore, we are not talking 
about a two, three, four, six or seven year statute of limitation 
as many others. 
Even considering the evidence in the light more favorable to 
the Defendants, the case was filed just (1) day or just a few 
hours after the one year lapse of the statute. 
Every equitable argument in this case argues in favor of 
allowing an amendment so that Plaintiff's case can be heard. 
This is simply not a case where the evidence is stale, where 
undue delay was caused, but simply if anything, a mistake on the 
part of the Plaintiff as to the sequence of events surrounding a 
very unpleasant experience for her. 
The Court, sitting as a Court of equity, should have allowed 
the amendment which would have therefore, allowed Plaintiff's 
Claim to have been timely under the applicable statute of 
limitations period. 
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POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN DETERMINING THAT THE 
DEFENDANTS, ACTIONS OF AUGUST 2 8TH AND 
2 9TH CONSTITUTED A CONTINUOUS TORT, 
WHICH CLAIM WOULD HAVE SURVIVED THE 
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS ARGUMENT 
Plaintiff contends strongly, that the actions of the 
officers in this case constituted a continuous sequence of events 
which began at the very least, at approximately 10:30 p.m. on 
August 28, 1983 and ended at approximately 1:30 a.m. on August 
29, 1983. 
The Plaintiff takes the position that this entire episode 
was a continuing tortuous act, beginning the verbal and battery 
at her home, continuing in the police vehicle and ending with the 
arrest, booking and incarceration at the Weber County Jail. 
The Defendants did not deny that the matter extended over a 
period of two to three hours on both dates, but claimed that the 
Plaintiff could not recover for any specific actions which took 
place on the 28th, but only those which took place on the 29th 
and the Court of course, determined that if it was limited to 
those actions and the Court refused to allow the Plaintiff to 
amend the Complaint to focus on only those issues. 
Although the Plaintiff has found no Utah cases bearing 
directly on this issue, the Court is directed to the following 
cases and their analysis: 
Kenneth L. Baker v. Burbank, Glendale, Pasadena Airport 
Authorities, 705 P.2d 866, (1985) California. In this case, the 
Supreme Court of California discussed the tort of nuisance and 
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recognized that with respect to tortuous acts and the statute of 
limitations, a Trial Court must make a finding as to whether the 
tortuous act is continuing or permanent, because this has a 
direct bearing on the statute. 
If in fact the tort is considered permanent, that is to say 
the type by where one act a permanent injury is done and damages 
are assessed once and for all, then the statute runs from that 
time. If however, it is continuing in nature, as in this case, 
where the nuisance was noise and continued over a period of time, 
then the statute, if filed properly, includes any damages 
accruing within the statutory period proceeding, the commencement 
of the action. 
The Court further states that: 
It has been recognized that in doubtful 
cases, the Plaintiff should have the election 
to treat the nuisance tort as either 
permanent or not. (Id at 871) 
Applying this rationale to the case at bar, it is the 
Plaintiff's contention that the tortuous acts followed one 
continuing activity. That is to say, beginning with the unlawful 
entry of the Plaintiff's home, the assault, battery and verbal 
use, the forcing the Plaintiff to the hospital, the force used in 
taking Plaintiff in the police vehicle to the jail, the booking 
into the jail, the arrest and the charging, all were a continuous 
act with different parts. The Defendants were all involved 
through all stages of the proceedings. There was not a break in 
the activity to the extent that the Plaintiff was left alone, or 
that the Defendants' actions stopped and they proceeded in some 
11 
different action. But, these Defendants were with this Plaintiff 
from approximately 10:30 p.m. on the 28th until 1:30 a.m. on the 
2 9th, a three (3) hour continuum. 
This does not fit the concept of a permanent tort and 
clearly, based upon that rational, as long as the statute is 
applicable to the 29th if any actions took place during the 
continuing period, even before that time, they would be included. 
Thus, the actions for battery, verbal abuse and the forced taking 
of the Plaintiff from her home, although taking place on the 
2 8th, would be included in the entire tortuous act. 
This Court should also consider the case of Shores v. 
Branch, 720 P.2d 239 (1986) Montana. The Montana Court held that 
torts can be recognized as continuing when the tortuous act can 
be readily abated, even though it is not. Thus, in a continuing 
tort, recovery may be had for damages occurring within the 
statutory period proceeding the commencement of the action. 
In this case, the tortuous acts could have been readily 
abated. Initially, following the confrontation at the house, the 
officers could have left. They could have left the Plaintiff 
after she was treated at the hospital. They could have returned 
her to her home and taken no further action. Instead, rather 
than abating their conduct, they continued on a course which 
eventually resulted in the Plaintiff's arrest and incarceration 
in the Weber County Jail. 
Plaintiff . strongly contends therefore, that all the 
allegations in this case constitute a continuing tort. That the 
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actions beginning on the night of the 28th and ending on the 
early morning hours of the 29th were part of one continuing 
episode. From the time of the initial trespass to the booking in 
the Weber County Jail. There was no abatement and therefore, any 
of the Defendants7 actions which were part of the continuum 
beginning on the 28th can be brought within the filing on the 
29th. 
The Court was therefore, in error in not treating this'as a 
continuing tort and allowing the case to proceed on the merits. 
CONCLUSION 
The Trial Court basically decided a case which had been 
pending for almost two years after discovery had been taken and 
no Motions had been filed by the Defendants approximately three 
(3) weeks prior to Trial on a Motion for Summary Judgment based 
upon lack of jurisdiction due to the application of the one year 
statute of limitations required to file a claim against a 
governmental entity of its employee. 
The Court, in reviewing while Plaintiff concedes that the 
statute of limitations is jurisdictional, the Court is a Court of 
equity, has the discretion to consider all the facts in reviewing 
an argument concerning the statute of limitations to determine 
whether or not the Plaintiff in a case will be barred from its 
just remedy due to a strict limitation filing. 
In this case, Plaintiff provided the Court with two options 
with which to allow the case to continue on the merits. The 
first was the amendment of the Complaint prior to Trial to 
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comport with the facts to include the activities of the 2 9th of 
August, along with those of the 28th. Although this did not 
change the complexity of the case, nor the basic facts, the 
witnesses all of which had been known to the Defendants and their 
counsel for in excess of two (2) years and did not in any way 
prejudice the presentation of all the evidence on the merits fron 
either side, the Court chose not to allow this, even though 
Courts have readily allowed this practice in Utah, both before, 
during and at the end of Trial. 
The Court clearly abused its discretion in that decision. 
Notwithstanding that improper ruling, the Court, could have also 
treated, and without deciding that issue, the actions complained 
of in the original'Complaint and the Complaint as it was allowed 
to be amended by the Court as one continuing tortuous act, thus 
bringing in the allegations of the 28th to those of the 29th. 
The Court refused to this and again, Plaintiff believes 
committed prejudicial error. 
Wherefore, Plaintiff respectfully request that this Court 
review the applicable law as it applies to this case and 
determine that in fact the Court made an error in not allowing 
either the amending of the Complaint or treating the matter as 
continuous tort and return the cas^ £cft fCpf^al on the merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 
t^i JOHN 
Attorney for Appellant 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I mailed four true and correct copies 
of the above and foregoing Brief to the counsel for the 
Defendants, Joy L. Sanders, Andrew M. Morse, Attorneys at Law, 10 
Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor, P.O. Box 45000, Salt Lake City, 
Utah 84145, and Dale J. Lambert, Attorney at Law, 175 South West 
Temple, 510 Clark Learning Building, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, 
postage prepaid this day of April, 1988. 
JOHN T. CAINE 
Attorney for Appellant 
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63-30-13 STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL 
Compl i ance wi th sect ion. 
Complaint alleging that tax commission and 
its agent acted maliciously and arbitrarily in 
at tempting to enforce payment of excise taxes 
and in compelling plaintiff to supply a surety 
in greater amount than was reasonable to en-
sure payment of the tax. requesting damages 
both compensatory and punitive was fatally 
defective in that it did not allege compliance 
with this section; tax commission and its agent 
were immune from suit for damages where the 
acts complained of were performed in good 
faith and within the statutory authority 
granted to them. Roosendaal Constr. & Mining 
Corp. v. Holman, 28 Utah 2d 396, 503 P.2d 446 
(1972). 
Plaintiffs complied with this section where, 
within a year after the cause of action arose, 
they filed notice of claim with the attorney 
general and the agency concerned on the same 
day they filed the original complaint with the 
court, and amended complaint alleging compli-
ance with the Governmental Immunity Act 
was filed, as a matter of right, within one year 
after denial of the claim or after the end of the 
90-day period in which the claim is deemed to 
have been denied. Johnson v. Utah State Re-
tirement Office, 621 P.2d 1234 (Utah 1980). 
Quiet title ac t ions . 
Notice of a claim for quiet title complies with 
this section if it is given not more than one 
year after plaintiffs right to possession has 
been disturbed or encroached upon by the 
state. Ash v. State, 572 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1977). 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 72 Am. Jur . 2d States, Ter-
ritories, and Dependencies §§ 124, 126. 
C.J .S. — 81A C.J.S. States §§ 269, 271, 272, 
310. 
A.L.R. — See A.L.R. Annotations set forth 
under § 63-30-11. 
Key N u m b e r s . — States &=> 174, 177, 197. 
63-30-13. Claim against political subdivision or its em-
ployee — Time for filing notice. 
A claim against a political subdivision or against its employee for an act or 
omission occurring during the performance of his duties, within the scope of 
employment, or under color of authority, is barred unless notice of claim is 
filed with the governing body of the political subdivision within one year after 
the claim arises, or before the expiration of any extension of time granted 
under Subsection 63-30-11(4). 
His to ry : L. 1965, ch. 139, § 13; 1978, ch. 
27, § 7; 1983, ch. 131, § 3. 
A m e n d m e n t Notes . — The 1983 amend-
ment inserted 'for against its employee for an 
act or omission occurring during the perfor-
mance of his duties, within the scope of em-
ployment, or under color of authority"; substi-
tuted "claim arises" for "cause of action arises"; 
and added "or before the expiration of any ex-
tension of time granted under Subsection 
63-30-11(4)." 
Cross-References . — Actions arising out of 
contractual rights or obligations not subject to 
this section, § 63-30-5. 
Mailing claims to state or political subdivi-
sions, § 63-37-1 et seq. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Claims barred. 
Claims by minors. 
Claims for death. 
Construction and application. 
Contract action. 
Estoppel. 
Full compliance required. 
Necessity for presentation of claim. 
Notice. 
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JOY L. SANDERS 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for Defendant Officer 
Wallerstein 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City,' Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
ANDREW M. MORSE 
SNOW, CHRISTENSEN & MARTINEAU 
Attorneys for. Defendant Officer 
Jensen 
10 Exchange Place, Eleventh Floor 
Post Office Box 45000 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 521-9000 
DALE J. LAMBERT 
ROBERT K. HILDER 
CHRISTENSEN, JENSEN & POWELL 
Attorneys for Defendant Officer 
Smith 
175 South West Temple, Suite 510 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101 
Telephone: (801) 355-3431 
IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR WEBER COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
VIRGINIA YEARSLEY, 
Plaintiff, 
FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, AND 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
VS 
OFFICER DEAN JENSEN, OFFICER 
STEVEN WALLERSTEIN, and OFFICER 
STEVEN SMITH, Civil No. 94172 
Defendants 
This matter having come on for hearing before the Honorable 
David E. Roth on the 2nd day of November, 1987, plaintiff being 
represented by John T. Caine, defendant Dean Jensen being 
represented by Andrew M. Morse, defendant Steven Wallerstein 
being represented by Joy L. Sanders, and defendant Steven Smith 
being represented by Dale J. Lambert, the Court having heard 
oral argument, having reviewed the memoranda, exhibits, and
 ;. 
affidavits, and with good cause appearing therefor, does now 
enter its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. That during the late evening hours of August 28, 1983, 
the defendant police officers were acting in the course and 
scope of their duties when an altercation broke out at 
plaintiff's home. Prior to midnight on the 28th, plaintiff was 
arrested, handcuffed, placed in a police vehicle, and taken to 
McKay Dee Hospital where she was examined for possible injuries 
resulting from the altercation with police. 
2. The certified copy of plaintiff's medical records from 
McKay Dee Hospital shows that she was admitted for her 
examination at 11:38 p.m. on August 28, 1983. After the 
examination was completed, she was transferred to the Weber 
County Sheriff's Department where she was booked at 1:20 a.m. 
on August 29, 1983. 
3. On August 29, 1984, Plaintiff filed a notice of claim 
alleging trespass and assault. The notice of claim was filed 
one year and one day after the alleged trespass and assault. 
-2-
4. All acts complained of in plaintiff's Complaint 
occurred on August 28, 1983. 
5. Plaintiff's notice of claim did not comply with Utah 
Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1965 as amended). 
6. Plaintiff pled guilty to and was convicted of
 ; 
disorderly conduct as a result of the altercation on August 28, 
1983. 
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court hereby 
enters its: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. That the plaintiff's claims arising from the alleged 
assault and trespass on August 28, 1983, are barred by 
plaintiff's failure to comply with the notice of claim 
provisions of Utah Code Ann. § 63-30-13 (1965 as amended). 
2. That since plaintiff's arrest occurred on August 28, 
1983, an Amended Complaint as requested by plaintiff, to 
include a claim for false or unlawful arrest would also be 
barred by plaintiff's failure to comply with Utah Code Ann, 
§ 63-30-13 (1965 as amended). • 
3. Although plaintiff has requested leave to amend to 
include a claim for malicious prosecution, that cause of action 
is quite different from the causes of action defendants were 
put on notice of in plaintiff's notice of claim and in 
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plaintiff's Complaint and would, therefore, be improper as well 
as untimely. 
Based upon the foregoing Findings of Fact and Conclusions 
of Law, it is hereby 
ORDERED, ADJUDGED, AND DECREED that defendants' Motion foi» 
Summary Judgment is granted and that plaintiff's Complaint is 
dismissed with prejudice, no cause of action, without costs. 
DATED this / y day of November, 1987. 
BY THE COURT: 
V J mo Sfavid E.HKbth 
District Court Judge 
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